“I Don’t Want to Grow Old and Weak Like You!”: Conceptions of Idealized Masculinity in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema by Ale-Ebrahim, Benjamin
40   |   JOURNAL OF undERgRaduatE RESEaRCh
“I Don’t Want to Grow Old and Weak Like You!”:




How did you become involved in doing research?
I became interested in this topic while enrolled in Dr. Wuthrich’s capstone 
seminar course this semester.
How is the research process different from what you expected?
The research process is not as straightforward as I expected. I had to 
narrow the scope and topic of my paper significantly from the beginning 
of the semester.
What is your favorite part of doing research?
My favorite part of doing research is learning new things about 









Michael Wuthrich, Assistant Director of the 
Center for Global & International Studies
AbstrAct
Iranian women are often at the forefront of feminist discourse on gender roles in the Middle East. There can be 
no question that this is important work and there are many questions about feminine gender roles in the Middle 
East and Iran that remain unanswered. However, gender norms in this family-centered society are often shaped 
by their relation to the opposite sex. As such, social scientists must understand both men’s and women’s roles 
in order to gain an appreciation for the complexity of social dynamics in a predominantly gender-segregated 
country like Iran. While most literature on the subject of gender in Iranian cinema focuses on women, little has 
been written explicitly about men and masculinity. This paper will attempt to close some of the gaps in this 
research by contrasting the category of the “ideal Iranian man” in popular films from two major periods in Iranian 
cinema—the highly Westernized era of the 1960s and 70s and the politically Islamist era of the 1980s and early 
90s. Just as the nature of the Iranian national consciousness underwent a drastic change following the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, so too did the nature of Iranian gender norms. By analyzing two films each from the pre- and 
post-revolutionary eras using three important variables—class conflict and religious piety, male-female sexual 
dynamics, and age differences among men—I will trace the path of these changes and suggest reasons for the 
similarities and differences one can observe between pre- and post-revolutionary Iranian films.
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IntROduCtIOn 
Iranian women are often at the 
forefront of feminist discourse on 
gender roles in the Middle East, 
and for good reason. As the more 
obviously “gendered” half of the 
population, questions abound 
regarding women’s social status, 
women’s representations in the 
media, and women’s roles in 
constructing national consciousness. 
There can be no question that this is 
important work and there are many 
questions about feminine gender 
roles in the Middle East and Iran 
that remain unanswered. However, 
due to predominantly patriarchal 
social norms prevalent in the region, 
women in Iran do not enjoy many of 
the same rights and privileges that 
their fathers, husbands, brothers, 
and sons do. Gender norms in 
this family-centered society are 
often shaped by their relation to 
the opposite sex. As such, social 
scientists must understand both 
men’s and women’s roles in order 
to gain an appreciation for the 
complexity of social dynamics in a 
predominantly gender-segregated 
country like Iran. 
While most literature on the 
subject of gender in Iranian cinema 
focuses on women, little has been 
written explicitly about men and 
masculinity. This paper will attempt 
to close some of the gaps in this 
research by contrasting the category 
of the “ideal Iranian man” in popular 
films from two major periods 
in Iranian cinema—the highly 
Westernized pre-revolutionary 
era of the 1960s and 70s and the 
staunchly reactionary and politically 
Islamist post-revolutionary era of 
the 1980s and early 90s. Just as 
the nature of the Iranian national 
consciousness underwent a drastic 
change following the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, so too did the nature of 
Iranian gender norms. By analyzing 
two films each from the pre- and 
post-revolutionary eras using three 
important variables—class conflict 
and religious piety, male-female 
sexual dynamics, and age differences 
among men—I will trace the path of 
these changes and suggest reasons 
for the similarities and differences 
one can observe between pre- and 
post-revolutionary Iranian films. 
LItERatuRE REVIEW and 
gaPS In RESEaRCh
Though not comprehensive, a 
substantial amount of research exists 
regarding femininity and idealized 
notions of womanhood in Iranian 
cinema. According to Hamid Naficy, 
women in pre-revolutionary Iranian 
cinema can be categorized into 
three main “types:” female “blood 
relations” of male characters, who 
are “pure” and “virtuous;” wives 
of male characters, who are also 
pure to some extent; and “women 
entertainers,” who exist purely for 
male characters’ pleasure (2011: 289). 
Idealized women, the first two types 
in the scenario outlined above, are 
typically associated with the home 
and private spaces. Impure women 
of the third type are associated with 
public spaces, like teahouses and 
brothels (Naficy 2011: 289). A man 
has the power to remake an impure 
woman by marrying her or giving 
her his patronage. As such, women in 
this era of Iranian film do not possess 
a great deal of agency and depend 
heavily upon their male relatives and 
lovers to provide for them.
Pre-revolutionary Iranian cinema 
has a generally “bitter look, because 
most of its characters are anti-heroes, 
alone in a world that offers them no 
hope of justice” (Mirbakhtyar 2006: 
98). Due to the oppressive political 
conditions under the Pahlavi regime, 
in which artists and intellectuals 
living in Iran were unable to voice 
their true opinions, the filmmakers 
of this period focused their 
narratives on “rebellious characters 
who were in conflict with a political 
order and society that denied them 
their basic rights” (Mirbakhtyar 
2006: 99). They focus extensively on 
urban-rural, class, and age conflicts 
as Iran slowly emerges from its 
traditional way of life and becomes 
a modern industrial nation. Iranian 
cinema instructs theatergoers on 
how to cope with this new way of 
life, “usually, though not always, 
suggesting naïve solutions” (Sadr 
2006: 1). As an outlet for artistic 
and political expression and an 
instructive tool for the reigning elite, 
cinema in Iran would continue to 
influence the national consciousness 
in much the same way following the 
1979 Islamic Revolution as it had in 
the late Pahlavi era. 
Following the violent political 
upheaval at end of the 1970s, Iranian 
cinema “was for a time virtually 
extinguished” (Sadr 2006: 187). 
Women in Iranian films “went 
back under the veil” and the new 
regime’s censors restricted any 
plotlines that did not conform to “a 
rigid code requiring Muslim women 
be shown as chaste and maternal, 
never sexualized” (Sadr 2006: 188). 
The first few post-revolutionary 
Iranian filmmakers to emerge from 
the confusion and chaos of the 
revolution were primarily concerned 
with creating an “Islamic cinema” 
(Mirbakhtyar 2006: 107-8) palatable 
to the ayatollahs newly in charge 
of the country. Once this new crop 
of producers and directors gained a 
significant amount of filmmaking 
skills, they began to look at cinema 
“more and more as a form of artistic 
expression, instead of viewing it 
strictly through the lenses of religion 
and ideology” (Mirbakhtyar 2006: 
108). In other words, once cinema had 
“proven itself” as potentially beneficial 
to the goals of the revolutionary 
government, it was allowed to 
flourish once more—albeit within the 
limits of the official moral codes.
Women in the post-revolutionary 
era continued to be portrayed on 
screen as either innocent wives and 
mothers or corrupt degenerates 
(Derayeh 2010: 151). In the early 
years of the revolution, women were 
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“structurally absent” from films 
until the mid-1980s (Naficy 2012: 
111-135). At this time, they began 
to gain a “background presence” 
until the late 1980s when women 
were moved into the “foreground” 
of Iranian cinema plotlines (Naficy 
2012: 111-135). According to Najmeh 
Moradiyan Rizi, the compulsory 
veiling of Iranian women in film was 
intended to “control the female body 
and make heterosexual desire highly 
masculine” (2015). As women were 
compelled to don the veil in public 
spaces, including on screen, they 
surrendered control of their own 
bodies to the men in charge of public 
morality (Moradiyan Rizi 2015). Men 
continued to exercise control over 
Iranian women in the immediate 
post-revolutionary years, just as they 
had control over women in the late 
Pahlavi era. 
Despite political progress 
toward freedom of expression and 
the improvement of the status of 
women’s rights in Iran beginning in 
the late 1980s, women’s portrayals in 
Iranian film from the 1960s through 
the 1980s remained defined by their 
subordination to men, while the 
two-dimensional characterization 
of female characters as either pure 
(khaales) or morally corrupt ( faased) 
persisted. The ideal woman remains 
one’s mother, sister, or wife, while 
the street entertainer or dancer 
elicits no empathy, for she is merely 
the object of one’s carnal desires. 
Although the 1979 revolution 
changed the language and codes 
with which Iranian women were 
oppressed on screen, her oppression 
did not relent. Rather, the defining 
event that shifted representations 
of femininity in Iranian film did not 
occur with the 1979 revolution but 
several years later. What remains 
unclear is whether cinematic 
portrayals of Iranian men remained 
constant over this same time period 
and, if there was a thematic shift in 
the representation of masculinity 
in Iranian film, how the men of 
post-revolutionary Iran compare to 
the men of the pre-revolutionary 
era. Perhaps a look at masculinity 
in another national film tradition 
can provide further context for 
understanding gender norms in 
Iranian cinema.
In their discussion of feminist 
literature on Hollywood cinema, 
Cohan and Hark write that by 
“concentrating on the female body 
as the primary stake of cinematic 
representation,” feminist scholarship 
generally ignores “the problem 
of masculinity that motivates 
the system” (1992: 1). In other 
words, one must study men and 
masculinity in order to gain a 
nuanced appreciation for normative 
gendered behavior in any patriarchal 
society, whether in the United 
States or Iran. They further argue, 
“the scant attention paid to the 
spectacle of men ends up reinforcing 
the apparent effacement of the 
masculine as a social construction 
in American culture” (Cohan and 
Hark 1992: 3). By studying the 
construction and negotiation of 
masculinity on screen, one begins 
to question the dominant ideal of 
a patriarchal society that the man 
is normal and undifferentiated 
while the woman is abnormal and 
secondary to men. In this paper, I 
will engage in a similar process 
in my analysis of Iranian gender 
norms, with a particular focus on 
masculinity.
Currently, there is no substantial 
body of literature discussing 
masculinity in Iranian cinema 
during the immediate pre- and 
post-revolutionary eras. As such, 
this paper can begin to address 
this neglected topic by combining 
previous research on feminine 
gender norms in Iranian cinema 
with analysis of masculinity in 
other film traditions. I lay out my 
theoretical framework for achieving 
this goal in the section below.
thEOREtICaL FRaMEWORK 
In the years since Michel Foucault 
first published his monumental Power/
Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977 (1980), it 
has been essential to complicate such 
categories as gender and sexuality 
when analyzing cultural change. This 
process involves an Archaeology of 
Knowledge (Foucault 2012) in which 
the researcher must investigate the 
history and political implications 
of cultural forces that construct 
normative behavior. This essay seeks 
to conduct a Foucauldian archaeology 
of the category of the “ideal man” in 
two important and contrasting eras of 
Iran’s cinematic history.
According to the most 
contemporary gender theorists, 
especially Judith Butler in her 
influential Gender Trouble (2002), 
masculinity and femininity consist of 
a performance in which we all engage 
in our daily lives, often unaware that 
we are simply acting in the ways we 
are taught within the boundaries 
of our cultural upbringing. It is the 
job of the researcher, then, to make 
explicit these ways of enacting 
gender and their limitations within 
any specific cultural context. This 
theoretical paradigm is especially 
useful for analysis of visual media, 
including film. Through content 
analysis, one can get at such 
complex notions as the definition of 
masculinity and manhood in Iranian 
society and how these definitions 
have changed over time. 
Some studies exist that examine 
how masculinity is constructed in 
Iran and other Muslim-majority 
countries. Amar (2011) writes that 
masculinity in the Middle East is 
often understood in the popular 
Western imagination as “in crisis,” 
“hypersexualized,” and dangerous to 
the order of the state. He proposes 
a more nuanced understanding 
of Middle Eastern men in critical 
scholarship, conscious of the history 
of colonialism in the region and 
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of class distinctions among each 
society in question. As such, we 
can infer that the motivations and 
representations of upper-class 
Iranian men in cinematic portrayals 
are going to be significantly different 
from those of middle- and lower-
class Iranian men. There exists a 
hierarchy of power, in which those 
in power—the Iranian clerics 
who determine media policy and 
prominent film producers and 
directors who work within politically 
determined boundaries—have 
different motivations from those 
they seek to influence—the Iranian 
theater-going public. Because of the 
inherent connection between Iran’s 
theocratic elite and film production, 
social class and religious piety have 
much to do with Iran’s conception 
of itself as a nation and these 
themes inevitably find themselves 
being replicated on screen.
Similarly, Bruce Dunne, in his 
Power and Sexuality in the Middle 
East (1998), writes that “sexual 
relations in Middle Eastern societies 
have historically articulated 
social hierarchies” in which men 
are dominant and women are 
submissive. One’s gender identity 
is traditionally inextricable from 
one’s sexuality. Therefore, in order 
to be a “real man,” one must engage 
in heterosexual activity—ideally, 
getting married and fathering 
children. Women are expected to 
be mothers, protecting the nation’s 
moral foundation by instilling within 
the next generation the ideals of 
the past. Men are unquestionably 
superior to women in this traditional 
framework, and manhood rests in 
sexual activity and virility. Both 
masculinity and femininity serve 
vital and complementary roles in 
maintaining the structure of the 
state and of devout Islamic society.
Finally, Peter Hopkins (2006) 
contends that there are two 
dominant discourses of Muslim 
masculinities—that of virile 
aggression and that of academic 
effeminacy. As such, all men in 
a predominantly Muslim society 
will fall somewhere on a spectrum 
from the virile young man, 
promiscuous and womanizing, to 
the respected older scholar, aloof 
and asexual. Homosexual tendencies 
are, theoretically, tempered by 
homosociality. That is, men are 
encouraged to befriend one another 
but to seek sexual release with 
women, not among themselves. 
Generally, although older men 
are well respected in traditional 
Iranian value systems, the old man 
is perceived as impotent and lacking 
of some measure of masculinity. 
Younger men possess a more potent 
form of masculinity, dangerous in its 
disregard for social norms.
In this paper I intend to use 
these three variables, namely class 
differences and their relation to 
religious piety, male-female sexual 
dynamics, and age differences 
among men, to analyze and compare 
four films from the pre- and post-
revolutionary eras of Iranian cinema. 
I will then determine whether or not 
the frameworks provided above can 
adequately explain the phenomenon 
of masculinity in Iranian cinema or 
whether they should be modified 
to reflect the Iranian case. This will 
be completed through analysis of a 
“typology” of Iranian masculinity, as 
described below.
MEthOdOLOgY
In this paper I will provide an 
archaeology of masculinity in two 
major periods of Iranian cinema. 
These two periods are: the late 
Pahlavi era of the 1960s and 70s, 
and the 1980s and early 1990s 
immediately following the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. I will analyze 
two films from each period, focusing 
on how masculinity is presented 
across the spectrum of Iranian 
society, its foundations in sexuality 
and men’s relationships with women, 
and the political aspects of manhood. 
I will now describe my reasons for 
periodizing Iranian cinema in this 
fashion and for my choices in films 
to analyze.
I have chosen to focus my 
research on what I view as two 
distinct time periods in the history 
of Iranian cinema. The film of the 
late Pahlavi era provides a baseline 
with which to analyze the changes 
in Iranian society after the 1979 
revolution. As such, it is important 
to understand how masculinity 
functioned in this time period in 
order to grasp the changes that 
were to come. The film of the years 
immediately following the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, in which Iran 
turned its back on the Western 
world and asserted a distinctly 
Islamist political orientation on 
the international stage would, in 
theory, differ in its portrayal of men 
and masculinity from the Pahlavi 
era against which it rebels. By 
comparing these two contrasting 
eras, one following directly after the 
other, I hope to shed light upon the 
effects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
on gender norms and idealized 
conceptions of masculinity in Iran. 
In choosing only two films from 
each time period, I have had to 
be selective in which films I feel 
would provide the most valuable 
information for my analysis of 
masculinity in Iranian cinema 
over time. Primarily, I looked for 
films that attempt to depict life in 
Iran with some degree of realism. 
Heavily metaphorical or stylistic 
films, like Mehrjui’s The Cow (1969) 
and Makhmalbaf’s The Cyclist (1987) 
were excluded from my analysis. I 
still want to focus on fictional films, 
and so I excluded documentaries 
and biographies from my study. 
Additionally, because I want to 
understand the Iranian national 
consciousness from an official 
perspective, I chose films that were 
screened in Iranian cinemas and 
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therefore made it past government 
censors. I have not included films 
that were banned even for a 
time in Iran, including Bashu, the 
Little Stranger (Bayzai, 1986) and 
Hajji Washington (Hatami, 1998). 
Furthermore, I excluded any Persian-
language or Iranian-made films that 
are not set in Iran, such as Turtles 
Can Fly (Ghobadi, 2004). This left 
me with a narrower set of films from 
which to choose, but I still had to 
exclude several options. At this stage 
of my search, I focused on films that 
had prominent male protagonists. 
This excluded Meshkini’s The Day 
I Became a Woman (2000), Majidi’s 
Baran (2001), and Farhadi’s About 
Elly (2009), among others. At the 
end of this process, I was left with 
Iranian-made feature films set 
in Iran that attempt to depict the 
everyday life of men and boys. 
Where there were more than two 
films that fit this category in either 
era, I chose the most popular ones 
among Iranian cinemagoers.
My list of films to watch for 
this study is as follows: from the 
late Pahlavi era, I have chosen 
Qeysar (Kimiai, 1969) and Gozaresh 
(Kiarostami, 1977), and from the 
1980s and early 90s, I have chosen 
Marriage of the Blessed (1989) and 
Hamoun (Mehrjui, 1990). From 
these films, I will tease out common 
themes in the popular depiction of 
masculinity in both the pre- and 
post-revolutionary eras of Iranian 
cinema. In order to do this, I will 
watch for the three variables I have 
discussed above—class differences 
and religious piety, male-female 
sexual dynamics, and age differences 
among men.
In addition to these three main 
variables, I will pay close attention 
to what happens to men and 
boys in relation to the following 
categories: place of birth (urban/
rural), place of residence (urban/
rural), age, occupation, military 
service (veteran/not veteran), social 
class, level of religiosity (devout/
secular), marital status (married/
unmarried/divorced/ widower), 
health status, and parenthood status 
(father/childless). In this way, I 
intend to create a profile for each 
major male character in these films 
in an attempt to understand his 
background and gain insight into the 
motivations for his actions. This will 
result in the compilation of several 
“types” of Iranian man that will shed 
light on the popular conception of 
masculinity in each time period.
Similarly, in creating profiles for 
each major male character, I will 
also pay attention to his sexuality 
and relationship with women 
and girls. Especially in the post-
revolutionary era when the sexes are 
so strictly separated from each other, 
understanding a male character’s 
relationship with the members of 
the opposite sex will shed light not 
only upon his personal relationship 
with women but will also provide 
information on the “type” of Iranian 
man he represents. Categories 
and tropes that I will look for in 
this section include: relationship 
with mother, relationship with 
father, relationship with children, 
relationship with wife/fiancé, 
aggressiveness towards women, 
aggressiveness towards other men, 
passivity towards women, passivity 
towards men, flirtatiousness, and 
other expressions of sexuality  
or virility.
Finally, I will consider the 
political implications of masculinity 
in both eras of Iranian film. Whether 
as the model for the ideal family, a 
metaphor for the Iranian fatherland, 
or as a heroic martyr of the 
revolution, manhood in all eras of 
Iranian film is inherently entwined 
with the politics of the time. Tropes 
I will look for in this section include: 
men’s roles in service to the state, 
characteristics of the “ideal Iranian 
man,” which men are “successful” 
and why, which men are “heroes” 






I will begin my analysis by 
discussing two films from pre-
revolutionary Iran. It is important to 
understand these films as a baseline 
for the rest of my analysis, as post-
revolutionary Iranian cinema is both 
a continuation of and reaction to the 
themes present in the films from the 
late Pahlavi era. I will give a brief 
synopsis of each film, followed by a 
discussion of the typology of Iranian 
men in the film of this period, 
expressions of sexuality and virility, 
and political implications in relation 
to the three main variables I have 
discussed above—social class and 
its relation to religious piety, male-
female sexual dynamics, and age 
discrepancies between men.
Qeysar (1969)
Qeysar is the story of a young 
man’s quest to avenge his sister’s 
honor after she is raped by three 
brothers and commits suicide in 
shame. This drama film follows 
courtesy: Film society
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Behrouz Vossoughi, one of the most 
famous Iranian actors of the time, 
as Qeysar—the brooding hero. He 
comes into conflict with several 
characters at various points in his 
quest, most notably with Mansour 
Ab-Mangol—one of the men 
responsible for his sister’s rape—
and with his uncle, a cautious and 
reserved older man who advises his 
nephew to refrain from violence. In 
the end, Qeysar succeeds in killing 
all three brothers responsible for the 
death of his sister but suffers a life-
threatening stab wound at the hands 
of Mansour and is captured by the 
police in a dramatic end to this story. 
 
Gozaresh (The Report) (1977)
This film follows the story of one 
middle-class Iranian family on the 
cusp of the 1979 revolution; it is a 
bitter portrait of modern Iranian life 
among the wealthy, Westernized 
elite. The protagonist of this film 
is a morally flawed tax collection 
official by the name of Mohammad 
Firouzkoui. After a dispute with 
an older gentleman from rural 
Iran accusing him of taking bribes, 
Mohammad is laid off from his 
government job and this causes 
conflict with his family. Mohammad 
has a wife named Azam and a 
very young daughter at home. The 
narrative follows the daily life of 
this small family through various 
arguments and internal struggles, 
eventually ending with Azam 
attempting suicide and Mohammad 
spending the night at a hospital by 
her side. 
There are a few distinct types of 
pre-revolutionary Iranian man that 
emerge after viewing these two films. 
They can be broken down into three 
major categories: the brooding anti-
hero; the older, socially conservative 
father figure; and the sexually virile 
foil. Both Qeysar and Mohammad 
Firouzkoui fall under the category of 
the brooding anti-hero. Despite their 
obvious character flaws—Qeysar 
openly drinks alcohol and frequents 
bars while Mohammad gambles 
and accepts bribes at work—they 
are portrayed in a sympathetic light 
in their interactions with women 
and girls. Qeysar’s sense of duty to 
avenge his sister’s honor implies that 
his masculinity is inherently tied to 
female chastity and macho displays 
of violence. He identifies himself as a 
pahlavaan (a “champion” or “hero”) 
in an argument with his older uncle, 
justifying his noble quest. Similarly, 
though he is portrayed as a greedy 
scoundrel at work or a liar and a 
cheat in his marriage, Mohammad 
is generally a protective and loving 
father. When he takes his daughter 
with him to a bar—normally not 
something a good father would do—
he hides the fact that he is drinking 
alcohol from her and brings her a 
sandwich to eat in the car while she 
waits for him. The protagonists of 
these two films follow Mirbakhtyar’s 
(2006: 98-99) model of pre-
revolutionary anti-heroes, stuck 
in conflict between their internal 
desires and the existing socio-
political system in which they live. 
Qeysar seeks revenge for his sister’s 
death while Mohammad seeks self-
fulfillment in a loveless marriage.
The second important type of 
pre-revolutionary Iranian man 
is the older, socially conservative 
father figure. In Qeysar this model 
can be seen in Qeysar’s uncle, while 
in Gozaresh the older man who 
accuses Mohammad of bribery 
falls into this category. In contrast 
to the hot-blooded Qeysar, the 
young man’s middle-aged uncle 
serves as a wise, restrained foil to 
his nephew’s youthful masculinity. 
Upon reading the news that his 
niece has committed suicide after 
being raped in a note she has left, he 
refrains from telling his sister—the 
girl’s mother—what truly happened 
to her daughter, saying, “It’s good 
that she left this world.” He believes 
that the older woman should not 
be exposed to the horrible truth, 
stoically refusing to answer her pleas 
for more information. Furthermore, 
he expresses a different form of 
masculinity than Qeysar when he 
criticizes his nephew for setting out 
on a killing spree to avenge his sister. 
He urges the young man to respect 
the honor of his elders and not to 
worry his mother by embarking on 
a dangerous quest. In an argument 
with Qeysar, he calls him young and 
thoughtless (“to javaan-i! bifekr-i!”). 
Qeysar’s uncle defends himself from 
Qeysar’s criticism by saying, “The 
older you get, the closer to God.” It is 
clear, then, that the two central male 
characters of this film have vastly 
different notions of what it means to 
be a man and what type of behavior 
manhood entails.
Similarly, one of Mohammad’s 
elderly clients accuses him of 
accepting bribes and emerges as a 
father figure, attempting to enforce 
traditional social norms. This 
man speaks with a rural accent 
and unsuccessfully appeals to the 
traditional morality of the young 
men who work in the tax collection 
office. Outraged at Mohammad’s 
attempt at bribery, he shouts, “Aren’t 
you ashamed, young man?” He 
courtesy: Filmoteca
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then appeals to a perceived common 
identity, saying, “We’re all Muslims, 
aren’t we?” He explains that he is 
happy paying his taxes because the 
government provides service to the 
poor, but corruption enrages him 
because money from bribes only go 
to the one who accepts them. After 
Mostapha’s plea that Mohammad 
has a wife and children to worry 
about at home, the man retorts that 
“these kind of people don’t spend 
money on their family.” As we have 
seen with Qeysar, there is a distinct 
conflict between the morality 
expressed by older men and that of 
younger men. Class differences also 
play into this exchange regarding 
proper manly behavior, with the 
lower-class older man calling upon a 
perceived common religious identity 
when disputing with the higher-
class younger men in the tax office.
The third type of man in this era 
of Iranian cinema is the sexually 
virile foil, providing a contrasting 
model of male-female sexual 
dynamics than the anti-hero. While 
Qeysar and Mohammad have 
some redeeming qualities, their 
promiscuous counterparts do not. 
Mansour Ab-Mangol, Qeysar’s 
enemy and one of his sister’s rapists, 
is sneaky and lurks in the shadows—
he runs from his enemy rather than 
confronting him directly. He refuses 
to admit wrongdoing when he is 
confronted at the beginning of the 
film by Qeysar’s younger brother, 
whom he proceeds to kill. Mansour 
rapes Qeysar’s sister, setting the 
long string of events into motion that 
lead to his death. Mansour is the 
opposite of the ideal Iranian man—
the audience is meant to despise him 
for his violation of female chastity 
and Qeysar righteously kills him in 
the final scene of the film. Not quite 
so obviously flawed, Mohammad’s 
friend Mostapha encourages him to 
go out drinking with some of their 
coworkers, thereby encouraging 
Mohammad’s infidelity. He spends 
time with prostitutes, drinks alcohol, 
and gambles his money away at 
casinos and encourages Mohammad 
to do so as well. Mostapha’s bachelor 
status allows him to act out while 
Mohammad is punished in his home 
life for doing similar actions.
While idealized men in these 
films do not always treat women 
with respect, with Qeysar ignoring 
his mother’s warnings against his 
murderous quest and Mohammad 
cheating on and beating his wife, 
ideal forms of masculinity in the 
pre-revolutionary era of Iranian film 
are generally associated with sexual 
fidelity and equitable treatment of 
women and girls. Older men attempt 
to reign in the reckless virility of 
younger men, as female chastity is 
associated with family honor. The 
men who do not treat women with 
respect, especially Mansour but also 
Mohammad, are punished for their 
action—Mansour is murdered while 
Mohammad loses his job, loses face, 
and is forced to take his wife to the 
hospital after she attempts suicide. 
In general, then, masculine models 
of behavior parallel Naficy’s (2011: 
289) two-fold model of femininity: 
the men who respect women in the 
private sphere and do not succumb 
to the temptations of corrupt women 
in the public sphere are successful, 
while the men who do not respect 
female chastity or who engage with 
corrupt women are not successful.
Politically, men are idealized for 
their willingness to stand up for 
their personal morality against a 
perceivably unjust society. Qeysar 
emerges as the hero despite 
warnings from his mother and 
uncle not to embark on his quest. 
The elderly client at Mohammad’s 
office stands up for his rights in the 
face of government extortion and 
successfully achieves his goal of 
suspending the younger man from 
his job. This fits in with Mirbakhtyar 
(2006: 99) and Sadr’s (2006: 1) model 
of men as “rebellious characters” 
who served as instructive models 
to the Iranian theatergoing public. 
These anti-establishment political 
models, and a great deal of public 





In post-revolutionary Iranian film, 
one witnesses both a distinct break 
from previous cinematic codes as 
well as a great deal of continuity 
in the tropes filmmakers employ. 
Through discussion of the themes 
present in post-revolutionary  
Iranian cinema, one can begin to 
understand the effect the revolution 
had on the representation of 
masculinity on screen. 
Marriage of the Blessed (1989)
This film follows the story of a 
soldier, Haji Agha Pakdel, returned 
home from the brutal Iran-Iraq 
war and his struggle to re-adapt 
to civilian life. He battles post-
traumatic stress disorder and 
attempts to reintegrate into a 
society that does not conform to his 
idealistic morals. After returning 
home from the hospital to his 
wealthy fiancée (Mehri) and his job 
as a photojournalist, he begins to 
notice that the revolutionary ideals 
he fought so hard to defend in the 
courtesy: Firouzan
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war with Iraq are not being practiced 
by many Iranians on the homefront. 
During his wedding, he attacks the 
decadence of the elite society and 
runs away from his privileged life to 
live homeless on the street. The film 
closes as a photojournalist attempts 
to take a photo of him living in a 
slum, with Haji rebuffing the camera. 
Hamoun (1990)
This film follows the story of Hamid 
Hamoun, a married PhD student 
who struggles to balance his work 
life with his home life. His wife, 
Mahshid, is an aspiring painter 
who comes from a wealthy family. 
Mahshid wants to divorce Hamid 
and both hire lawyers to argue their 
respective cases in court. Through 
a complicated series of flashbacks 
and dream sequences, the viewer of 
this film begins to understand the 
beginnings of Hamid and Mahshid’s 
complex relationship. Hamid sets 
out on a quest to reunite with his 
spiritual mentor and old friend 
Ali, but cannot find him. Hamid is 
obsessed with religion and the story 
of Abraham’s “divine madness” in 
his love for God and willingness to 
sacrifice his own son—he conflates 
his love for Mahshid with Abraham’s 
love for Isaac. After an unsuccessful 
attempt to shoot Mahshid with a 
shotgun, Hamid runs into the ocean 
in a fit of madness and the film drifts 
off in a dream sequence where he 
is rescued by Ali and Mahshid and 
they throw a party on the beach. 
Iranian men in post-revolutionary 
cinema can be categorized into 
several broad categories. These 
include: the crazed, idealistic 
young man; the wealthy older foil; 
and the just-out-of-reach spiritual 
mentor. The main characters in 
both of the films included in this 
story, Haji Agha and Hamid, fall 
into the category of the idealistic 
young man. Haji Agha Pakdel, 
whose name roughly translates as 
“clean-hearted man who has made 
the Hajj pilgrimage,” suffers from 
psychological trauma and struggles 
to reconcile his revolutionary ideals 
with everyday Iranian life. When 
he returns from the hospital after 
being injured in the war, his doctor 
advises him not to watch films 
about tragedies in other parts of 
the world so as not to trigger any 
painful memories. Haji goes against 
this advice and watches news 
reports about the war in Lebanon 
and famines in Africa, saying, “the 
oppressors have returned” and “it 
is like before the revolution.” His 
fiancée Mehri worries about him, 
telling him, “You’re torturing 
yourself. So what if the rich are 
returning? You do not represent the 
nation!” Despite this, it is clear that 
this is exactly how Haji sees himself 
—as the embodiment of the ideal 
revolutionary martyr. He refuses to 
develop film that depicts uncovered 
women at his job, for example, and 
is obsessed with photographing 
the poor and dispossessed in his 
journalistic career. Ironically, as he 
and Mehri go out one night on a 
photo-shoot, they are arrested by the 
Basij (morality police) and must go to 
the police station to prove they have 
a government permit to photograph. 
It seems that even the most idealistic 
young revolutionary cannot escape 
government harassment.
Similarly, Hamid is portrayed as 
a crazed academic, obsessed with 
his work and unconcerned with his 
family. Mahshid accuses him of being 
“obsessed with himself,” unconcerned 
with her and their daughter. Hamid 
protests this notion, contending that 
he is “weak in the face of power,” 
going on to name his “mother, 
father, country, and Mahshid” as the 
powerful forces that influence the 
course of his life. When he listens to 
Mahshid describe to her psychologist 
her marital struggles with him, 
Hamid reminds himself that “her 
bills break my back” —who is she to 
complain when he has to deal with 
the economic problems of the family? 
Furthermore, Hamid’s character 
flaws are consistently described as 
being common to all Iranian men. 
Mahshid’s psychologist comforts her 
that “it’s common to all Iranian men 
to terrorize.” Mahshid’s mother, in 
a confrontation with Hamid about 
why he refuses to grant her daughter 
a divorce, says “you’re like all men 
—egotistical and abusive.” Hamid is 
not alone in his self-obsession and 
disregard for others. 
Both Haji Agha and Hamid come 
into conflict with older men who 
are generally wealthier and wiser 
than their younger counterparts. 
Mehri’s wealthy father stands in 
sharp contrast to Haji’s idealistic 
naiveté. Though he admires aspects 
of Haji’s character, he does not 
consider him a suitable match for 
his daughter. He thinks he is crazy 
and unable to provide economically 
for his daughter due to his mentally 
unstable state, saying “I love Haji 
like a son, but he cannot work.” He 
would rather Mehri marry one of the 
many rich suitors he has lined up 
for her, but he accepts his daughter’s 
choice when she emphasizes that 
only Haji can make her happy. Haji 
does not have a fond impression 
courtesy: IMDb
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of this future father-in-law, telling 
Mehri that “your father will defeat 
the revolution from the inside.” 
Because he is a wealthy businessman, 
Haji doubts his concern for social 
justice and therefore does not 
respect him. As we have seen in 
the previous two films, there is a 
sharp contrast between the ideals 
and conceptions of masculinity 
embodied by younger men versus 
older men in this film. Hamid’s 
lawyer also provides an older, wiser 
foil to his character. When advising 
him to go through with his divorce, 
the lawyer says to Hamid, “You 
sold yourself to get rich. You chose 
a beauty, she no longer wants you. 
Better off with a monkey.” The 
lawyer has no time for sentimentality 
and is only concerned with practical 
matters in regards to Hamid’s marital 
situation. He advises his younger 
client to “divorce her [Mahshid],” for 
she “has the upper hand.” Because 
Mahshid comes from a wealthy 
family and Hamid can only rely 
upon his academic credentials, his 
lawyer tells him to get out of this 
emasculating situation and move on 
to a more comfortable family life as a 
divorced man. 
The third type of man common 
to both films is the elusive spiritual 
mentor to the main character. For 
Haji Agha, he is his own spiritual 
mentor in that he cannot seem to 
live up to the high revolutionary 
ideals he sets for himself. People 
both respect and pity Haji for his 
inability to distinguish between 
idealism and the reality of everyday 
life. Mehri’s brother admires him 
when he says, “Brother Haji’s camera 
is the anxious eye of the revolution.” 
When discussing his daughter’s 
impending marriage, Mehri’s father 
states his admiration for his future 
son-in-law’s military service and 
idealism. Haji is criticized, however, 
for his extreme devotion to his 
ideals. One of Mehri’s friends visits 
a medicine woman to buy a charm 
for her friend, saying she is “going 
to marry a nitwit.” Mehri herself 
accuses her fiancé of “enjoying acting 
the martyr.” Haji alienates those 
around him with his erratic and 
strange behavior, especially during 
his wedding speech. Rather than 
thank his guests for coming, he 
uses this opportunity to decry the 
opulence of the Iranian upper class. 
He begins to chant —“Eat the food 
robbed from the poor. Robbed food is 
delicious! Robbed food is delicious!” 
(haraam-khori khoshmaze ast!). After 
this stunt, he is forcibly taken from 
the microphone and runs away to 
live in poverty.
On the contrary, Hamid seeks 
spiritual guidance from two 
mentors—the prophet Abraham 
and an old friend named Ali. As 
he writes his PhD dissertation on 
the subject of “Abraham’s love and 
faith,” he also attempts to emulate 
the life of the ancient prophet. He 
says at one point, “one must be 
like Abraham —willing to destroy 
one’s life to regain her [Mahshid].” 
Hamid’s search for spiritual 
guidance in the life of the prophet 
Abraham also leads him to seek 
out his old mentor Ali. Ali is an 
elusive character in this film —he 
is only seen in passing or in dream 
sequences and does not speak to 
Hamid directly. Ali is a middle-aged 
to older man who seems to possess 
some sort of mystical knowledge 
that Hamid finds enticing. As Ali 
searches for his children throughout 
the film, he evades Hamid’s attempts 
to find him. At the end of this film, it 
is Ali who rescues Hamid from the 
ocean in his dream and joins him for 
a party on the beach along with other 
important people in the younger 
man’s life. Though Hamid seeks the 
advice of Ali and comes very close 
to meeting with his long-lost mentor 
on several occasions, it is only in his 
mind that he actually finds the older 
man and talks with him. 
Following the revolution and 
its new set of morals, obvious 
expressions of sexuality are largely 
absent in both of the films from 
this period. Male-female dynamics 
are largely restricted to the home 
and the marital relationship; Haji 
Agha and Hamid are not tempted 
to cheat on their wives and fiancées 
with women in bars and teahouses. 
Rather, their relationship struggles 
emerge from both men’s internal 
discontent and dissatisfaction. 
Hamid’s self-obsession drives 
Mahshid away, while Haji Agha’s 
obsession with living out the ideals 
of the revolution drive him from 
mainstream society completely. On 
the spectrum of potent virility to 
academic effeminacy that Hopkins 
(2006) discusses, both protagonists 
from the post-revolutionary era tend 
heavily toward the latter. 
Politically, both films fall in line 
with the revolution’s emphases upon 
anti-Westernization, populism, and 
elevation of the status of religion in 
everyday life. Both Haji Agha and 
Hamid are deeply religious, almost 
to the point of insanity. They both 
search for guidance in the ideals 
of Shia Islam—especially self-
sacrifice and martyrdom. Haji Agha 
is disgusted by the amount of class 
distinction that still exists in the 
post-revolutionary era, using his 
wedding as a pulpit from which to 
decry the decadence of his future 
father-in-law’s lifestyle. Hamid is 
also troubled by class differences, 
with many of the arguments he 
has with his wife centering on 
money and finances. In the post-
revolutionary era, unsurprisingly, 
the highly religious lower class is 
idealized while the secular upper 
classes are decried and protested 
against by the main characters in 
both films. 
dISCuSSIOn
In both the pre- and post-
revolutionary Iranian films I 
have analyzed, a constant trend 
remains the conflict between 
young and old men regarding 
proper masculine behavior. In all 
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four films, older men constantly 
criticize their younger counterparts 
for not behaving in traditionally 
masculine ways. Qeysar’s uncle 
criticizes his nephew for his hot-
blooded pursuit of revenge while, 
in Marriage of the Blessed, Mehri’s 
father finds Haji Agha unsuitable 
to marry his daughter due in part 
to his unwavering devotion to 
revolutionary ideals. Older men 
respect the boundaries society 
has placed upon their behavior 
while younger men appear to be 
motivated primarily from an inner 
sense of what’s right, regardless of 
what society has to say. In Gozaresh, 
Mohammad feels entitled to accept 
bribes for his own personal benefit 
while Hamoun attempts to shoot his 
wife in emulation of the prophetic 
command to “destroy one’s life in 
order to regain it”—both in clear 
violation of social and legal norms. 
Similarly, social class creates 
conflict among the men in the films 
included in this study. In Gozaresh, 
the elderly customer of the tax office 
is outraged that all of the younger 
men in the office are defending the 
practice of bribery. In Marriage of the 
Blessed, Haji Agha is outraged at the 
social inequity that still pervades 
post-revolutionary Iranian society 
and blames the rich for “defeating 
the revolution from within.” In both 
Marriage of the Blessed and Hamoun, 
the main characters’ fathers-in-law 
disapprove of them because they 
come from a lower social class than 
the women they wish to marry. The 
men who occupy the upper classes 
of Iranian society are depicted as 
uninterested in the fate of the lower 
classes and seek to maintain the 
status of their families by opposing 
their daughters’ marriages to men of 
lower classes. While younger men 
generally occupy the upper classes in 
the pre-revolutionary films and older 
men the lower classes, the opposite 
is true for post-revolutionary films. 
Despite this shift in demographics, 
the class conflict remains constant in 
both eras of Iranian cinema.
The instructive nature of Iranian 
cinema is another theme that 
has remained constant in post-
revolutionary films. Despite vastly 
different socio-political conditions, 
Iranian filmmakers continue to 
provide behavioral models in their 
films after which the Iranian public 
can model themselves. Just as one 
could identify with the urge for 
revenge after a great injustice, as 
in Qeysar, or the strained family 
dynamics present in Gozaresh, one 
can also identify with Haji Agha’s 
frustrated revolutionary fervor and 
Hamid’s quest for self-fulfillment and 
greater meaning in life. While these 
models may suggest “naïve solutions” 
(Sadr 2006: 1), they also represent the 
dominant social concerns of the time 
and reflect a range of broader social 
trends that dominated the Iranian 
national consciousness following the 
1979 revolution. 
Haji Agha, in his war-hardened, 
mentally unstable state, acts not 
just as a model for the reaction 
to the harsh realities of the post-
revolutionary era and the brutality 
of the Iran-Iraq war, he forces the 
audience to question the morality 
of the revolution and the war 
themselves. If a pious, talented 
young man such as Haji Agha can 
be tainted so severely by war and 
revolutionary fervor, how much more 
so the masses of less-gifted and less-
ideological young Iranian men of 
the time? In many ways, Hamid is a 
model of the ideal Iranian man of the 
post-revolutionary era—he studies 
diligently and engages in a quest 
for spiritual meaning. However, he 
too is deeply flawed. If such a man 
—who, on the surface, is perfectly 
admirable —can maintain such 
deep character flaws as Hamid’s 
self-obsession and disregard for his 
family, where should the masses of 
young Iranians look to find a proper 
role model? The simplistic good-
versus-evil dynamic one observes 
in pre-revolutionary Iranian cinema 
is completely shattered in the post-
revolutionary era.
Despite the various continuities 
one can observe in both eras of 
Iranian film, one major difference 
is the breakdown of simplistic 
conceptions of masculinity in the 
post-revolutionary era. Qeysar is 
potently masculine and, despite 
a few minor character flaws, 
generally heroic in his cinematic 
portrayal. With Mohammad’s 
character, one can begin to observe 
the complication of the simplistic 
hero-villain dynamic. However, 
he is still generally successful in 
his family life; despite her suicide 
attempt, his wife survives and the 
two continue to raise their daughter 
together. Haji Agha and Hamoun 
are more nuanced characters—both 
attempt to maintain their families 
while struggling with mental 
illness. While the pre-revolutionary 
model of Iranian manhood appears 
to be either potently masculine 
or strikingly impotent, the post-
revolutionary one allows for more 
complexity. 
This complication of the 
hero-villain dichotomy reflects a 
changing understanding of male-
female sexual dynamics in the 
post-revolutionary era. In the pre-
revolutionary era, women were either 
chaste and motherly or promiscuous 
and objectified (Naficy 2011: 289). In 
the post-revolutionary era, one can 
begin to see a shift in gender norms 
that would become more prevalent 
in the late 1980s (Naficy 2012: 
111-135). As women move to the 
foreground of Iranian cinema, they 
become increasing more complex 
characters. Because of the symbiotic 
relationship that exists between the 
sexes in any patriarchy, this also 
means that men’s portrayals also 
50   |   JOURNAL OF undERgRaduatE RESEaRCh
become more complex and nuanced. 
While the pre-revolutionary era 
consisted mainly of macho men 
and damsels in distress as well as 
adulterous husbands and desperate 
housewives, the post-revolutionary 
model of gender relations consists 
of empowered women and their 
impotent, fanatical husbands.
Considering the Islamic nature of 
the 1979 revolution, it is no surprise 
that conceptions of religious piety 
and their association with social 
classes underwent a significant 
shift in the post-revolutionary 
era. Whereas religiosity is mainly 
associated with the powerless lower 
classes in the pre-revolutionary 
era, as exemplified by the incident 
between Mohammad and his 
elderly customer, religious piety 
is mainly associated with heroic 
men and is admired by members 
of the upper class in the post-
revolutionary era. Although Haji 
Agha himself comes from a lower 
class background, his future father-
in-law (somewhat begrudgingly) 
admires him for his revolutionary 
zeal. Hamid has also managed to 
marry a woman of a higher social 
class, yet still he is obsessed with 
religion and martyrdom. This trend 
of idealization of religious fervor 
makes sense in light of the fact that 
the new government promotes and 
maintains Islamism as the basis 
of its identity. Any film produced 
in this era cannot be too critical of 
religion for fear of censorship.
In general, then, representations 
of masculinity in the post-
revolutionary era differ from those of 
femininity in several important ways. 
Whereas women’s portrayals in 
Iranian film from the 1960s through 
the 1980s remain defined by their 
subordination to men, cinematic 
portrayals of men in Iranian 
cinema of the same time period 
are not defined by their relation 
to women so much as they are to 
broader social changes. Men become 
more complex characters after the 
revolution, as they must deal with 
an entirely new set of socio-political 
circumstances. No longer brooding 
anti-heroes acting in defiance of 
government oppression, men in 
the post-revolutionary era reflect a 
new national turn inward. These 
men seek self-fulfillment and the 
realization of their ideological goals, 
just as the revolutionary government 
struggles to build a new state after 
the collapse of the old regime. For 
men, who have always been more 
politically empowered than women 
in Iran, the revolution resulted in a 
complete shift in their worldview and 
this shift is reflected in the cinema of 
the period.
COnCLuSIOn
While this research sheds light upon 
the portrayal of masculinity in the 
films I have analyzed above, this 
study should not be used to draw 
broad conclusions about masculinity 
as portrayed in the whole of Iranian 
cinema or Iranian society writ large. 
I conceive of these films as brief 
snapshots into the consciousness 
of each individual filmmaker 
who produced them, inevitably 
recreating—on some level—the 
ideals of masculinity and manhood 
he encounters in his daily life in Iran. 
In this way, these films can serve as 
microcosms of Iranian conceptions 
of masculinity, but they are no more 
than this.
Despite this caveat, there are 
a few words to be said about 
general trends observable in the 
forms of masculinity depicted in 
pre-revolutionary Iranian films as 
compared to post-revolutionary ones, 
as discussed above. Gender norms 
and conceptions of masculinity in 
Iranian cinema are very large topics 
and further research is needed to 
determine an accurate and nuanced 
archaeology of the “ideal Iranian 
man” across the history of Iranian 
film. It is the hope of this researcher 
that this study can serve as a basis 
for such a long-term project. Future 
avenues of research must include 
a more comprehensive survey of 
Iranian cinema, not just in the time 
period addressed but also in the 
number of films analyzed. It would 
be very interesting to see whether 
the trends discussed in this paper 
hold true for films produced in the 
1990s and beyond, especially as the 
corpus of Iranian cinema constantly 
expands in size and quality of 
production.
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